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Professional sports leagues across the United States are routinely recognized as profitable 
businesses. These leagues have enjoyed the luxury of brand recognition and a loyal customer 
base for decades. Unfortunately, along with all the benefits, professional sports leagues have also 
inherited the problems of a profitable industry. One such problem is labor strikes, which are 
commonly referred to as lockouts in the world of professional sports.          
In the past, the effects of lockouts in the National Football League (NFL), Major League 
Baseball (MLB), and the National Hockey League (NHL) have been studied to address the 
question “do lockouts reduce fan support?” The proxy commonly used to examine fan support is 
attendance. Past research has shown that lockouts across all three major leagues have had similar 
effects on league attendance, the only difference being the magnitude. These studies have shown 
that lockouts had negative short-term effects on fan support. Furthermore, Treber and Mulcahy 
(2016) found evidence that lockouts in the NHL had negative long-term effects on league 
revenue.  
The impact of lockouts in one league: The National Basketball Association (NBA) has 
not been examined. Thus, the question remains do NBA Lockouts effect fan support. Examining 
the 1999 and 2012 NBA lockouts, this thesis finds evidence that NBA lockouts effects resemble 
existing studies on lockouts in other major league sports.  
The NBA, when compared to the MLB and NFL, is new to lockouts, but other major 
sports leagues have a long history with them. The NFL, which is viewed as the most valuable 
sports league in America, was also the first professional sports league to experience a lockout in 
1968. According to https://www.football-reference.com/ 1the1968 lockout, while short, started a 
                         
1 http://www.espn.com/nfl/topics/_/page/nfl-labor-negotiations 
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trend that haunted professional sports leagues and their respective fans for decades. The 1968 
NFL lockout was followed by two more lockouts in 1970 and 1974 but all three would reach 
resolution early on, and thus had minimal effects on fans of the league. It wasn’t until the 1982 
NFL lockout where the effects of the lockout would directly affect the fans of the league. Prior 
NFL lockouts would reach a resolution before the official start of the season. The 1982 NFL 
lockout, on the other hand, didn’t reach a resolution until the midway point of the 1982 NFL 
season. This result would shorten the season to 9 games per team. Becoming the first NFL 
lockout where the fans lost the opportunity to watch a full season of games. The 1982 NFL 
lockout wasn’t the last one either. The 1982 NFL lockout was followed by four more NFL 
lockouts in 1987, 2001, 2011, and 2012. It was evident that fans of the NFL hated lockouts 
because they had the ability to shorten the season.  
The MLB is baseball’s - commonly referred to as Americas favorite pass time – 
professional league. The MLB has a rich history of lockouts. Unlike the NBA and NFL, 
according to https://www.baseball-reference.com2/ the first ever MLB lockout in 1972 would 
have a direct effect on the fans of the league. The 1972 season had to cancel 86 games because of 
its lockout. This would be a common trend for MLB lockouts. The 1981 MLB lockout would 
cancel 713 game and the 1994 MLB lockout out would cancel the entire season a total of 2,430 
games plus the MLB world series. Thus, a grand total of 3,229 MLB games have been lost 
because of MLB lockouts.  
This pattern of lockouts plaguing professional sports leagues would soon enter the NBA. 
The first NBA lockout took place in 1995. Fortunately for the fans, the 1995 NBA lockout would 
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only last three months and ended prior to the start of the official NBA season. Thus, this lockout 
had little to no effect on league attendance. Similarly, the 1996 NBA lockout would not affect 
fans either, the lockout only lasting a couple of hours.  
The 1999 NBA lockout would bring a change to the past historical trend of NBA 
lockouts reaching a resolution prior to the start of the official NBA season. Evidently, the 1999 
NBA lockout would cost the league and its fans a total of 982 games. According to 
https://www.basketball-reference.com/,3 the 1999 NBA lockout would shorten the season by 32 
games per team. This new phenomenon of lockouts having a direct effect on the fans would 
continue in 2012. The 2012 NBA lockout would also shorten the NBA season by 16 games per 
team, a grand total of 480 games lost that season. This alarming trend of lockouts costing 
professional sports leagues games, attendance, and revenue had become a new area of study for 
past researchers and this thesis.  
 
Literature Review 
Research done on the effects of past lockouts seems to lead to similar conclusions. 
Schmidt and Berri (2002) examined MLB lockouts in 1981 and 1994 found evidence that the 
lockouts had negative short-term effects on league attendance. Schmidt and Berri (2002) along 
with Treber and Mulcahy (2016) commonly use the phrase short-term meaning the effects of the 
lockouts likely dispersing after 2 years. Coates and Harrison (2005) examined the same MLB 
lockouts in 1981 and 1994 and found a similar short-lived effect on league attendance. Neither 
was able to find conclusive evidence of the lockouts having effects that last past 2 years.  
                         
3 https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/06/the-nba-lockout-heres-
what-you-need-to-know/241251/ 
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Schmidt and Berri (2004) subsequently studied lockouts that have occurred in the NFL 
and NHL. Schmidt and Berri (2004) once again found no evidence of long-term effects on league 
attendance across all three major league sports. Treber and Mulcahy (2016), on the other hand, 
when expanding the research done by Schmidt and Berri (2004), found evidence to the contrary.  
 
Originally studies on lockouts were examined to determine if there was a possibility of 
lockouts hindering fan support, as measured by fan attendance. Treber and Mulcahy (2016) 
however used revenue as their proxy for fan support. When examining these leagues as a 
business the financial effects of these lockouts become transparent. Every lockout involves 
sizable upfront costs for all parties involved. During the duration of lockouts, players lose game-
day salary and team owners will forego revenue. But the true cost over time owes to the loss of 
fan support, which is feared to be permanently altered by lockouts. It is this fear of lookouts 
altering fan demand that leads to the question, do lockouts fundamentally change fan support?  
Thus, examining the effect of the lockout on revenue along with attendance should show if 
lockouts have the potential to change support. Schmidt and Berri (2004) and Coates and Harrison 
(2005) didn’t have the luxury of studying the revenue effects of lockouts because the data was 
unavailable at the time. Treber and Mulcahy (2016), on the other hand, had revenue data 
available. Treber and Mulcahy’s (2016) examination of the 1994, 2004 and 2013 lockouts on 
NHL revenues and attendance found evidence of long-term negative effects on league revenue. It 
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Background 
1. 1999 Lockout 
Before studying the statistical impact of the lockouts, it is important to understand the 
details and circumstances the led to the lockouts experienced by the NBA. The NBA, as one of 
the most prominent sports leagues in the Untitled States, had been reaping the benefit of decades 
of success, but signs of a downturn in the year 1998 were beginning to create concern. Sales of 
NBA apparel were down, and teams were losing money. Paul D. Staudohar (2014) During his 
research found that attendance had fallen by 15 percent in certain cites during the 1998 season. 
There was no clear reason as to why the league was facing this unexpected downturn. Thus, with 
the leagues experiencing some unfamiliar turmoil both the team owners and players knew there 
were going to be changes made to the collective bargaining agreement. 
The collective bargaining agreement was a legally enforceable contract for a specified 
period between the management of an organization (team owners) and its employees(players). It 
sets down and defined conditions of employment (wages, working hours and conditions, 
benefits, set salary cap, etc.). Both owners and players had found areas in the agreement that 
they felt needed change. Eventually, when one party doesn't agree with the other the league 
enters a lockout until a resolution is met. The first factor that leads to the 1999 NBA lockout was 
the rise in star player salaries. In 1977, the highest paid player in the NBA was Kareem Abdul-
Jabbar who earned $2,689,230 when adjusted for inflation. In 1987 when adjusted for inflation 
Patrick Ewing had earned $6,224,892, over a 200 percent increase compared to Kareem. In 1997, 
when adjusted for inflation, Michael Jordan had earned $44,735,545; over a 700 percent increase 
compared to Ewing. This rapid rise in star players salary become a reason for owners to request a 
change in the collective bargaining agreement. All the players mentioned were signed to teams in 
~ 8 ~ 
 
large market cities. Kareem played for the Los Angeles Lakers, Ewing played for the New York 
Knicks and Michael Jordan played for the Chicago Bulls. Thus, a trend was beginning to form 
where the large market teams were signing players to massive contracts. The top thirteen highest 
paid players in the league during the 1998 season made about 19 percent of total revenue 
available to all 450 players. Twelve of those players played for a large market team. The larger 
market teams had the benefit of offering a larger contract simply because they were more 
profitable and able to pay the star players more. It was clear that teams in Los Angles, New 
York, Chicago, etc. were more profitable than teams in Indiana, Ohio, and Utah, which might 
threaten the competitive balance of the league.  
This trend of large market teams signing most available star players lend to the owners 
wanting a hard salary cap to be included in the collective bargaining agreement. A hard salary 
cap meant that each team would be able to use a selected amount of funds to sign all their 
players. If the hard cap was set to be $60,000,000, the team must use only $60,000,000 to sign all 
its players. A professional team in the NBA would on average have fifteen men on a roster. 
Thus, if the Bulls used $30,000,000 to sign Michael Jordan, they only have $30,000,000 left to 
sign the remaining fourteen players.  
From the players’ perspective, the owners wanted to use the hard cap to contain and 
lower player salaries. Players believed if the hard cap entered the collective bargaining 
agreement, the owners would refuse to offer contracts with high salaries and use the hard cap as 
the reason. This fear of owners having the powers to offer lower salaries become the first factor 
that led to the 1999 NBA lockout. 
 The second factor that led to the 1999 NBA lockout was the split of revenue between 
players and owners. NBA players’ salaries are directly affected by the divide of overall revenue. 
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The larger the contracts, the larger the split for the players. With these factors along with some 
others, the league entered a lockout in 1999. In the early days of the lockout, the owners were 
offering a 50/50 revenue split along with a hard cap. The players, on the other hand, demanded a 
60/40 revenue split along with the league keeping a soft cap.  
A soft cap meant a team was able to spend money on players’ salaries even after 
exceeding the set amount created by the cap. The punishment for acceding a soft cap meant a 
team had to pay a tax on the amount over the cap. This soft cap was a barrier for large market 
teams attempting to sign all available star player but wasn’t a large enough deterrent to stop the 
large market team from signing star players. After both sides were unable to reach an agreement 
on the new collective bargaining agreement the NBA entered a lockout. The 1999 NBA lockout 
became the longest lockout in NBA history. The 1999 NBA lockout cost the league and its fans 
almost 40 percent of the regular season a total of 928 games. After the unexpected cancellation 
of 928 games, the motivation for reaching a resolution became, for all parties involved, to save 
the season. With the motivation of not having to cancel a full regular season, the lockout reached 
a resolution. The owners split of revenue became 53 percent, while the players became 47 
percent. The major factor for the players accepting a smaller revenue split was the league not 
allowing a hard salary cap to enter the collective bargaining agreement. 
2. 2012 Lockout 
The league at its surface had entered a period of tranquility prior to the 2011 NBA season, 
but when closely examined similar conditions that led to a lockout in 1999 were present. The 
year prior to the lockout, NBA teams collectively lost $300 million with 22 out of 30 teams 
being in the red. This led to the owners once again demanding a hard cap. The owners believed 
that a hard cap would help small market teams keep star players which in return would help 
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teams generate revenue. Players once again refused to allow a hard cap to enter the collective 
bargaining agreement. The players also wanted the collective bargaining agreement to increase 
the current $5 million average salary up to $7 million at the end of a player's proposed six-year 
deal. This request along with most teams losing money prevented both sides from reaching an 
agreement before the start of the 2011-2012 NBA season. Thus, the league entered a lockout. 
This lockout, while shorter than before, cost the league and its fans about 20 percent of the 
regular season, a total of 480 regular season games. During the early days of the lockout, the 
players requested a 57/43 revenue split. The players also didn’t want a hard cap to enter the 
collective bargaining agreement.  As the lockout progressed a new variable had entered the 
equation that wasn’t present during the 1999 NBA lockout. This variable is the possibility of the 
player agreeing to play professional basketball overseas. This new threat of NBA players joining 
another professional basketball league along with the loss of 480 games became the catalyst that 
led to a resolution. The new collective bargaining agreement had both sides agree to a 50/50 
revenue split and the hard cap was not added to the agreement. 
3. Market Size 
A common factor present during both lockouts was the owners wanting small market teams 
to prosper along with the large market teams. These markets experience lockouts and interact 
with fan bases in different ways than large markets. Thus, unlike previse research, this thesis 
examines the effects of each lockout on different markets along with the effects on the overall 
league. www.Bleacherreport.com4 had already created a market size index that separates the 
small market team from a large market team. This index used seven factors to determine which 
side of the spectrum each team would land. The factors are Fan Support (percentage of an arena 
                         
4 https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1333672-big-market-team-nba-power-
rankings#slide0 
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filled per game), Future Market Growth, Team Heritage (franchise history, including years spent 
in market and playoffs/titles), All-Time Winning Percentage, Fan Cost index, and Market 
Competition (considering other attractions and pro teams competing for dollars). Table 1 shows 
the separation of a large market team from small market teams.   
Data 
Attendance data for this thesis was obtained from three sources. The first two sources 
were ESPN.com and www.basketball-reference.com5, These two sources provided attendance 
data for every professional NBA team from 1990 to 2017. The third source for attendance data 
was http://www.apbr.org. This source provided attendance data for teams that had been retired 
from the NBA such as the Seattle Supersonics and Vancouver Grizzlies. Revenue data was 
extracted from Rodney Fort’s Sports Business Database.6 Fort’s database had obtained its 
financial data from the Forbes Annual NBA Team Valuations report. Financial data from 1990-
1996 and 1998-2017 were available in Fort’s database but 1997 was unavailable. This thesis will 
use the average of the years 1996 and 1998 for the 1997 NBA season. 
Methodology and Results  
This thesis will be using a first difference regression model to examine the effects of each 
lockout. During the examination, two different forms of effects had emerged. The first being a 
direct effect (the league losing revenue and attendance because stadiums/arenas where closed) 
and the second an indirect effect (the league losing/gaining revenue and attendance when there 
are games being played). The analysis will begin with an examination on the aggregate effects of  
attendance and revenue followed by a per-game analysis on attendance and revenue.  
                         
5 https://www.basketball-reference.com/play-index/tsl_finder.cgi 
6 https://sites.google.com/site/rodswebpages/codes 
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Aggregate Attendance  
The aggregate attendance analysis will begin by graphing the yearly attendance averages 
of each NBA season from 1990 to 2017. The results are shown in graph 1. Graph 1 does depict a 
slight increase in attendance, but overall attendance had been steady around 700,000 attendees 
on average. The graph also shows two colossal drops in attendance in 1999 and 2012, which 
were both lockout years. Graph 2 shows the regressed first difference of average attendance. As 
expected, the drop in attendance during the lockout-shortened seasons were neutralized by a 
corresponding increase in attendance the following season.  
There will be three different samples used to measure the effects of the lockout on 
different market sizes. The sample “Full” includes every professional NBA team, “Large” will 
include a large market team, and “Small” will include small market teams. The same first 
difference regression model will be used with every sample. Basic mathematical construction of 
the model is presented below: 
 
𝐷. 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡1999 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡9900 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡9904     
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡2012 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡1213 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡1217 +  𝜖𝑡 (1) 
 
As equation (1) indicates, Dummy variables Lockout1999 and Lockout2012 are created to 
measure the initial effects of the lockouts. Lockout9900 and Lockout1213 will capture the 
bounce back effect from each corresponding lockout. Lockout9904 and Lockout1217 will 
measure the long-term effect of their corresponding lockouts.  
Table 2 present the results of the regression. The figures presented in the table are averaged 
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yearly totals across each respected sample. Thus, the attendance figures from sample “Full” are 
averaged yearly totals of both the “Large” sample and “Small” sample. “Large” include 16 NBA 
and “Small” includes 17 NBA teams. 
During analysis, an examination of Lockout1999 shows that the 1999 NBA lockout had 
similar effects across the board. The 1999 NBA lockout cost the league 271,349 attendees on 
average. It cost 271,461 attendees when examining large market teams and 274,129 attendees 
when examining small market teams. Variables Lockout9900 and Lockout9904 are statistically 
insignificant and are thus uninterpretable. Lockout2012 estimates the initial effects of the 2012 
NBA lockout. During the examination, there does seem to be a larger decrease in attendees for 
large market teams compared to small market teams, but the lockout had lowered attendance 
across the board. The 2012 NBA lockout had cost the entire league 102,115 attendees, cost large 
market teams 148,288 attendees and cost small market teams, 125,785 attendees. Unlike the 
1999 NBA lockout, the 2012 NBA lockout’s corresponding bounce back variable (Lockout1213) 
is statistically significant. As is visible in Graph 2, there were 34,777 attendees increase the 
season following the lockout for the overall league. The bounce back effects for small and large 
market teams are statistically insignificant. During the examination of the long-term effect of the 
2012 NBA lockout, Lockout1217 shows the attendance in the long-term had increased by 36,477 
on average when examining the entire league. These effects align with past research done on 
similar lockouts across different professional sports leagues.     
 
Aggregate Revenue 
This thesis will be using the same first difference regression model to measure the effects 
of the lockouts on team revenue across the entire league and different market sizes. Once again 
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there will be three separate samples, “Full” includes every professional NBA team, “Large” will 
include a large market team, and “Small” will include small market teams. The same first 
difference regression model will be used with every sample. Basic mathematical construction of 
the model is presented below:   
 
𝐷. 𝐿𝑛(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠)
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡1999 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡9900 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡9904     
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡2012 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡1213 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡1217 +  𝜖𝑡 (2) 
 
Dummy variables Lockout1999 and Lockout2012 are created to measure the effects of the 
lockouts. Lockout9900 and Lockout1213 will capture the bounce back effect from each 
corresponding lockout. Lockout9904 and Lockout1217 will measure the long-term effect of their 
corresponding lockouts.  
Table 3 presents the results of the regression. Lockout1999 which measure the initial 
effects of the 1999 NBA lockout shows a 58 percent decrease in revenue across the entire NBA. 
When examining the effects of the 1999 NBA lockout on large market teams there is a 59 
percent decrease in revenue and a 56 percent decrease in revenue when examining small market 
teams. Overall, the 1999 NBA lockout had parallel effects on the league and its different 
markets.  
     The 2012 NBA lockout follows a similar trend. Lockout2012 shows a 7 percent decrease in 
revenue across the entire league, an 8 percent decrease in revenue across small market teams and 
a 15 percent decrease across large market teams. Examination of the bounce-back season 
following the 2012 lockout shows a steady increase across the league. This is evident with 
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lockout1213 having an 8 percent increase in revenue when examining the entire league and a 5 
percent increase when examining large market teams. Lockout1213 effect on small market teams 
are statistically insignificant, thus are uninterpretable. Lockout1217 shows that the 2012 lockout 
had negative long-term effects. During an examination of the entire NBA, there is a long-term 10 
percent decrease in revenue and a similar 10 percent decrease in revenue when examining small 
market teams. Lockout1217 effects on large market teams are statistically insignificant, thus are 
uninterpretable. These findings of lockouts having a negative long-term impact on fan support 
align with the research done on the NHL lockout by Treber and Mulcahy.  
Per Game Analysis 
 Furthering the research done on lockouts in professional sports leagues, this thesis will 
examine the effects of the lockout on a Per Game scale. This will be done to address the concern 
that there is a difference between fans losing interest in games and fans not being able to go to 
games because of cancelation. Thus, a pre-game analysis would eliminate this concern. For this 
per- game analysis the same first difference regression model will be used to measure the effects 
of the lockouts on team revenue across the entire league and different market sizes. Once again 
there will be three separate samples, Full includes every professional NBA team, Large will 
include a large market team, and Small will include small market teams. The same first 
difference regression model will be used with every sample. Basic mathematical construction of 
the model is presented below:   
 
𝐷. 𝐿𝑛(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠)
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡1999 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡9900 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡9904     
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡2012 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡1213 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡1217 +  𝜖𝑡 (3) 
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Dummy variables Lockout1999 and Lockout2012 measure the effects of the lockouts. 
Lockout9900 and Lockout1213 will capture the bounce back effect from each corresponding 
lockout. Lockout9904 and Lockout1217 will measure the long-term effect of their corresponding 
lockouts.  
Table 5 presents the results of the regression. Results show that the effects of the lockouts 
on the NBA and its different markets have similar effects when examined on a per-game scale. 
However, the effects of the pre-game analysis do differ in magnitude from the original aggregate 
analysis. Lockout1999 shows that the league lost 8 percent of its revenue when the sample 
includes the entire NBA. Lockout1213 shows that the bounce back effect present in the seasonal 
analysis is also present in the pre-game analysis. Lockout1213 shows a 2 percent increase in 
revenue when the sample contained the entire NBA and 5 percent when the sample contained 
only large market teams. Furthermore, lockout1217 which capture the long-term effects of the 
2012 NBA lockout, shows that on a per-game scale the lockout had a negative effect on revenue. 
There was a 16 percent drop in revenue when the sample includes the entire NBA and a 10 
percent drop in revenue when the sample includes only small market teams. These results align 
with the findings of the original seasonal analysis, which showed that the 2012 NBA lockout 
lowered revenue by 10 percent across the entire NBA.  
Other than magnitude, the area where the per game analysis differs from the seasonal 
analysis is lockout2012. Lockout2012 captures the initial effect of the 2012 NBA lockout, when 
examined on a seasonal scale the NBA lost 7 percent of its revenue, but on the per-game scale, 
Lockout2012 shows an increase of 9 percent. This distinction between lockout effects on a 
seasonal scale vs a per-game scale can be explained by multiple factors. One factor is an increase 
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in the cost of attending an NBA game during the 2012 NBA season. The Fan cost index shows 
that the cost of attending an NBA game had increased on average by 5 percent. Thus, on a per-
game scale with the added cost of attending an NBA began to collect an excessive amount of 
revenue per-game. This excess revenue becomes one of the factors that led to the 9 percent 
increase in per-game revenue captured by lockout2012.   
Analysis 
NBA lockouts effects on fan interest do seem to follow similar trends to other lockouts 
researched in the past. There was a clear upfront cost to all parties involved with the lockout. 
Team owners lost revenue and players lost game day salaries. On the other hand, the belief that 
the lockouts had harmed fan interest isn’t present during this thesis’s examination of the NBA 
lockouts. The metrics that show NBA lockouts don’t harm fan interest are the bounce back 
variables (Lockout9900 and Lockout1213) in the aggregate attendance and revenue analysis. As 
shown in tables 2 and 3 the fans returned to the arenas the first chance they got. Lockout1213 the 
variable that measures the bounce back effect of the NBA lockout captured an increase in attends 
across the NBA and its different markets. In addition, during the per-game analysis lockout2012 
captured a 9 percent increase in per-game revenue. As per the Fan Cost Index, the most 
professional teams in the NBA had risen the cost of attending a game to make up for the revenue 
lost during the lockout. Thus, on a per game scale fan were willing to pay a premium to return to 
NBA games. Showing that fans of the NBA hadn’t lost interest in the NBA. Thus, aside from the 
direct upfront cost of lockouts, fans of the NBA waited and welcomed the possibility of returning 
to the game they love.  
During the examination of the results, the formation of discrepancies between lockout 
effects on different markets begins to form.  The first area of discrepancy between markets is the 
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magnitude of initial lockout effects on attendance and revenue in 2012. During the 2012 lockout, 
both markets had their seasons shortened to 66 games, but the 2012 lockout cost large market 
teams 148,288 attendees and cost small market teams, 125,785 attendees. This difference of 
22,443 attendees in favor of small market teams can be explained by two factors. The first being 
the large market teams having greater competition for fan support, considering other attractions 
and pro teams competing for same fans. The second factor is the cost of attending a game. The 
fan cost index shows that the cost of attending a game in a large market increased by 5 percent, 
comparatively there was a 4 percent increase for a small market team. While a 1 percent 
difference may seem minuscule, the initial cost of attending a game in a large market was 
already $53 greater than a small market game. Thus, the 1 percent difference only magnifies the 
cost of attending a game in a large market compared to a small market. This discrepancy in 
lockout effect on attendance between markets is also present for revenue. The initial loss of 
revenue for small market teams was 7 percent. Comparatively, there was a 15 percent revenue 
loss for large market teams. This magnified loss in revenue could be attributed to similar factors 
that led to the magnified loses in attendees for large market teams.   
Furthermore, other than the difference in magnitude the lockouts effects across the league 
and its different markets have parallel effects on attendance and revenue. During the examination 
of lockout effects on attendance, loss in fan support doesn’t percent itself as a concern. While the 
initial effects of both lockouts cost the NBA 271,349 attendees during 1999 and 102,115 
attendees during 2012, these losses can be explained by the cancelation of games during each 
season. Results also show that attendance rebounded quickly following the 2012 lockout. These 
results are aligned with existing research done on lockouts in other major league sports. Fan 
support, however, does appear to be at risk when examining the long-term effect on revenue. The 
~ 19 ~ 
 
2012 lockout had lowered overall revenue by 10 percent when the sample included the entire 
NBA. There was also a 10 percent loss in long-term revenue when the sample only included 
small market teams. These results align with the research by Treber and Mulcahy (2016) done on 
the NHL lockout.  
Evidently, the findings of this thesis prove that the effects of NBA lockouts while 
differing in magnitude have parallel effects on revenue and attendance across the entire NBA and 
its different markets. There does seem to be an area of concern regarding fan support which is 
negatively affected by lockouts in the long-run, but the figures for the long-term effect might 
have also been altered by the yearly increase in the cost of attending a game. It has also become 
evident that NBA lockouts follow similar trends to lockouts in the other major league sports.   
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Large Market Teams Small Market Teams 
Atlanta Hawks  
Boston Celtics          
Brooklyn Nets          
Chicago Bulls       
Dallas Mavericks        
Detroit Pistons  
Golden State Warriors        
Houston Rockets   
Los Angeles Clippers     
Los Angeles Lakers             
Miami Heat        
New Jersey Nets        
New York Knicks     
Philadelphia 76ers  
Toronto Raptors 
Washington Bullets 
Charlotte Hornets/Bobcats  
Cleveland Cavaliers  
Denver Nuggets  
Indiana Pacers  
Memphis Grizzlies             
Milwaukee Bucks  
Minnesota Timberwolves  
New Orleans Hornets  
Oklahoma City Thunder  
Orlando Magic 
Phoenix Suns      
Portland Trailblazers  
Sacramento Kings  
San Antonio Spurs  
Seattle Supersonics  
















Lockout effects on attendance across the entire NBA and its different markets 
    Full NBA Large Market Teams Small Market Teams 
Lockout1999  
   
  -271,349***   -271,462***   -274,129***  
   (10,071)   (12,690)   (14,577)  
     
Lockout9900   -9,757  
                                               
7,623   -568  
   (113,368)   (13,020)   (10896)  
     
Lockout9904   -4,157   -16,951   -12,461  
   (5,982)   (12,825)   (9,620)  
     
Lockout2012    -102,115***   -148,288***   -125,785***  
   (7,793)   (9,051)        (8,353)  
     
Lockout1213   36,477***   4,744   -5,032  
   (9,071)   (10,596)   (15,179)  
     
Lockout1217   36,477***   35   -13,248  
   (7,241)   (19,122)   (24,719)  
     
Constants   2,942  
                                               
3,660  
                                              
2,321  
   (2,354)   (2,921)   (3,493)  
     
Observations   779 398 381 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***P<.001 



























































Lockout effects on revenue across the entire NBA and its different markets 
    Full NBA Large Market Teams Small Market Teams 
Lockout1999  -0.579*** -.588*** -0.559*** 
  (0.0270) (0.0377) (0.0340) 
     
Lockout9900  0.0372 0.0303 -0.00837 
  (0.0194) (0.0200) (0.0189) 
     
Lockout9904  0.0165 0.0384 0.0246 
  (0.0105) (0.0217) (0.0225) 
     
Lockout2012  -0.0717*** -0.152*** -0.0783*** 
  (0.0201)  '(0.0452)         '(0.0143) 
     
Lockout1213  0.0782*** 0.0489** 0.0210  
  (0.0129) (0.0175) (0.0122) 
     
Lockout1217  -0.102*** -0.0686          -0.104*** 
  (0.0136) (0.0530) (0.0293) 
     
Constants  0.0898***  0.0915*** 0.0943*** 
  (0.00440) (0.00626) (0.00728) 
     
Observations   779 398 381 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***P<.001 















Per Game Lockout effects on attendance across the entire NBA and its different markets 
    
Full 
NBA Large Market Teams Small Market Teams 
Lockout1999   -40   -117                                                         7  
   (-0.32)   (-0.76)   (0.04)  
     
Lockout9900   -119   92   -7  
   (-0.88)   (0.60)   (-0.05)  
     
Lockout9904   -50   -206   -152   
   (-0.71)   (-1.36)   (-1.31)  
     
Lockout2012   18   -65   -94  
   (.26)   (-0.50)   (0.86)  
     
Lockout1213   2   57   -61  
   (0.03)   (0.45)   (-0.33)  
     
Lockout1217   23   27   -161  
   (0.41)   (0.11)   (-0.53)  
     
Constants   34                                                       44                                                      28  
   (1.35)   (1.27)   (0.67)  
     
Observations   779 398 381 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***P<.001 






Per Game Lockout effects on revenue across the entire NBA and its different markets 
    Full NBA Large Market Teams Small Market Teams 
Lockout1999   -0.0846**   -0.0935*   -0.0643  
   (-3.13)   (-2.48)   (-1.89)  
     
Lockout9900   0.0373   0.030   -0.0084  
   (1.92)   (1.52)   (-0.44)  
     
Lockout9904   0.0165   0.0348   0.0246  
   (1.57)   (1.77)   (1.09)  
     
Lockout2012   0.0911***   0.0654   0.139***  
   (4.85)   (1.45)   (9.70)  
     
Lockout1213   0.0239*   0.0489**   0.0210  
   (2.24)   (2.79)   (1.72)  
     
Lockout1217   -0.156***   -0.0686   -0.104***  
   (-13.66)   (-1.29)   (-3.53)  
     
Constants   0.0895***   0.0915***   0.0943***  
   (21.19)   (14.63)   (12.97)  
     
Observations   779 398 381 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***P<.001 
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